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Abstract:

’

Gestalt psychologists proposed two distinct learning mechanisms. Associative learning
occurs gradually through the repeated co-occurrence of external stimuli or memories.
Insight learning occurs suddenly when people discover new relationships within their
prior knowledge as a result of reasoning or problem solving processes that re-organize
or restructure that knowledge. While there has been a considerable amount of research
on the type of problem solving processes described by the Gestalt psychologists, less
has focused on the learning that results from these processes. This paper begins with a
historical review of the Gestalt theory of insight learning. Next, the core assumptions of
Gestalt insight learning theory are empirically tested with a study that investigated the
relationships among problem difficulty, impasse, initial problem representations, and resolution effects. Finally, Gestalt insight learning theory is discussed in relation to modern
information processing theories of comprehension and memory formation.
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Introduction
What is Insight?
The term insight has been used in many different ways in the problem solving literature.
A search of APA PsycNET using the keywords “insight and problem solving” yielded a
range of recent definitions. Topolinski and Reber (2010) defined insight as an “experience
during or subsequent to problem-solving attempts, in which problem-related content
comes to mind with sudden ease and provides a feeling of pleasure, the belief that the
solution is true, and confidence in this belief” (pg. 401-2). In this definition, insight is a set
of metacognitive feelings of ease, pleasure, accuracy, and confidence that can accompany
memory retrieval during problem solving. Ollinger, Jones, and Knoblich (2008) defined
insight as a description of a particular type of problem solving sequence that happens
“when a problem cannot be solved using conventional stepwise methods and the problem solver suddenly realizes (the “aha!” experience) that the solution involves unconventional methods (the problem solver realizes that the problem needs restructuring)” (pg.
208). Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) defined insight as a type of problem situation where
“within the typically derived initial problem representation, the goal cannot be reached
and a restructured goal representation is required for solution.” They contrasted this with
non-insight situations where “the goal can be reached by search within the initial representation” (pg. 356). Finally, Luo and Niki (2003) defined insight as “the reorientation
of one’s thinking, including breaking of the unwarranted ‘fixation’ and forming of novel,
task-related associations among the old nodes of concepts or cognitive skills” (pg. 316).
Based on these definitions one can see common themes underlying the concept of
“insight” such as suddenness, restructuring/reorientation, and difficulty/fixation. In these
examples, the term insight is used in very different ways. In one definition, insight is a
psychological experience or phenomenon. In the next, it is a particular problem solving
sequence. In the next, it is a type of problem situation. And, in the last example, insight
is defined as a problem solving process. The difficulty in pinning down a definition of insight is not surprising, because the Gestalt psychologists and later researchers often used
this term in multiple ways (Chronicle, MacGregor, & Ormerod, 2004; Dominowski, 1981;
Köhler, 1959; Weisberg, 1996). To get to the root of the concept of insight, it is useful to
bring up the historical context in which it was first used (Ellen, 1982; Hergenhahn, 2009;
Hergenhahn & Olson, 2005).
The History of the Gestalt Concept of Insight
In the early 20th century, psychology was emerging from its roots in philosophy to become an empirically based and experimental science. Empiricist philosophies from the
19th century were playing a key role in shaping the new science. Empiricist philosophers,
such as J. Mill (J.S. Mill, 1869/1967) and Bain (1855/1977) had proposed that all memory
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phenomena are the result of the passive association of co-occurring sensations or ideas,
and all behavioral phenomena were due to the association of overt behaviors and resulting feelings of pleasure or pain (hedonism). Bain’s original conception allowed for learning
that was not just based on co-occurrence (contiguity) of environmental stimuli through
the law of constructive association. Bain proposed that ideas or memories that had been
previously acquired from the environment through passive association could themselves
be associated with each other through co-occurrence of recall, thereby creating “new combinations or aggregates different from any that have been presented to it in the course of
experience” (1855/1977, pg. 571 cited in Hergenhahn, 2009). It was this law of association
that Bain used to explain creativity. Despite allowing for this potential creative process,
Bain’s theory still proposed that gradual and passive association through contiguity and
reinforcement is the basic mechanism for all learning. The learning process he described
began with a need in the organism (e.g. hunger or danger). In the face of this need,
organisms would begin to produce random behaviors. If one of those behaviors ended
up co-occurring with the satisfaction of the need, then an association would be formed.
Over repeated re-exposures this bond would strengthen until the organism would begin
displaying the adaptive behavior immediately and consistently when that need arose.
Hergenhahn (2009) pointed out that in the late 19th century Bain’s books that presented this empiricist viewpoint, The Senses and the Intellect (1885) and Emotions and the
Will (1859), had become the standard textbooks for university psychology courses in both
the United States and Europe. Titchener’s (1899) A Primer of Psychology went a step further
to propose that all psychological phenomena could be explained based on elemental
components of sensations (sensory input), images (neurological traces of sensation), and affections (emotions), and that all learning consisted of the building of associations between
these psychological elements via the frequency of their co-occurrence. In the early 20th
century, this associationist approach to psychology culminated in Watson’s (1913/1994)
Behaviorist perspective where even Titchener’s psychological elements were abandoned
in favor of connections between environmental stimuli and overt behavioral responses.
It is in response to these ever stricter associationist theories of learning that the Gestalt
concept of insight was developed. Köhler (1959) recounted the sense of discontent with
associationist theories that accompanied the Gestalt movement in his presidential address
to the American Psychological Association. In this address, he discussed the “prison” of
“psychology as taught at the universities when we [the Gestalt psychologists] still were
students” (pg. 728, bracketed clarification of “we” added):
At the time, we had been shocked by the thesis that all psychological facts (not
only those in perception) consist of unrelated inert atoms and that almost the only
factors which combine these atoms and thus introduce action are associations
formed under the influence of mere contiguity. What had disturbed us was the utter
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senselessness of this picture, and the implication that human life, apparently so
colorful and so intensely dynamic, is actually a frightful bore (p. 728).

In this address, Köhler admitted that the concepts the Gestalt psychologists developed in their early work were often vague and misleading, and cited insight as an example
of such a concept. He went on to attempt to clarify the concept of insight:
What is insight? In its strict sense, the term refers to the fact that, when we are
aware of a relation, of any relation, this relation is not experienced as a fact by
itself, but rather as something that follows from the characteristics of the objects
under consideration (p. 729).
In other words, associationist theories attempted to explain all learning as the result
of gradual and passive association of repeatedly co-occurring external stimuli or the sensations they produce. However, the Gestalt psychologists proposed that, in order to fully
explain learning and behavior, theories needed to address internally-generated relationships between memories or ideas that are formed based on meaningful conceptual and
functional characteristics.
This point of view was articulated by Koffka (1935/1963) as the difference between the
geographical environment and the behavioral environment. The geographical environment
is a description of the physical elements (e.g. surrounding objects) and properties (e.g.
color, weight, position) of the situation in which an organism is behaving or learning. The
behavioral environment is the organism’s subjective interpretation of the current environment based on the aspects of the environment it is attending to or ignoring, its current
goals or motivations, its knowledge of the properties of the objects in environment, and
its prior experience with the functions or uses of the objects.
Therefore, associationist theories proposed psychological processes that work on
the sensations produced by the geographical environment (i.e. seeing the co-occurrence
in the external environment, or sight), whereas Gestalt theories proposed psychological
processes that work on the internal memory representations of the environment that
organisms form through perception, comprehension and the application of prior experience (i.e. insight). In this notion of the concept of insight, any psychological process or
behavior that is based on an organism’s subjective internal mental representation of a
situation, and not simply the objective co-occurrence of environmental stimuli, would
be an insight phenomenon.
The difference between these two approaches can be illustrated by contrasting
the problem solving behaviors of animals as described by Thorndike (1911) and Köhler
(1925/1956). In Thorndike’s experiments on animal problem solving, he put cats in a
“puzzle box” which contained various levers and switches, one of which would release the
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cat from the box (a desirable outcome). The cats’ problem solving behaviors began with
random movements until one happened to interact with the release device. When put in
the same situation for a second time, the cats again behaved randomly until interacting
with the release device by chance. Slowly, over multiple trials, the cats’ behaviors became
less random and more focused on the area of the release device. Eventually, the cats would
begin to go directly to the release device when put into the puzzle box. In this type of
problem solving behavior, solutions were discovered slowly through trial and error, and
new information was acquired incrementally as the release device became associated
with a desirable outcome over time.
Köhler (1925/1956) described a very different problem solving pattern in apes that
were put in the situation of having food placed out of their reach. He described a solution pattern where first the apes would try previously used problem solving strategies
to reach the food, such as attempting to climb to it on the cage or poke at it with a stick.
When these procedures failed, they would stop all overt problem solving behaviors for a
period of time. Finally, in some cases, they would quickly perform a distinct set of actions
to retrieve the food, such as stacking up crates and climbing on top of them. Unlike Thorndike’s cats, when the apes were put in the same situation again, they did not engage in
random behaviors or overt trial-and-error problem solving. Instead, the apes would often
quickly enact the same final solution they discovered in the previous trial.
The pattern of behavior exhibited by Thorndike’s cats fits perfectly with the associationist theories of learning. The cats gradually and incrementally learned the relationship
between pressing the release lever and opening the door through repeated exposure to
the co-occurrence of the two environmental events. However, the initial attempt --> failure
-->solution -->one-trial learning pattern observed by Köhler could not be explained by
proposing that the apes gradually formed new associations through the overt manipulation of environmental stimuli or repeated co-occurrence of recalled prior experiences.
Instead, Köhler explained this pattern by proposing that when the initial attempts at
solving the problem based on previously learned strategies failed, the apes abandoned
behavioral trial-and-error strategies in which they attempted to search for the solution in
the geographical environment, and began cognitive trial-and-error strategies where they
mentally searched for new functional relationships among different prior experiences. This
cognitive trial-and-error process, or reasoning, led to the discovery of new relationships
that restructured the apes’ behavioral environment.
Köhler’s results suggested that learning attained through manipulations of the internal behavioral environment (cognitive trial-and-error/restructuring) was qualitatively
different than learning attained through associative processes working on objects in
the external geographical environment (frequency of co-occurrence of external events/
contiguity). In order to highlight these differences, Gestalt psychologists referred to the
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learning processes involving internal cognitive processes as insight learning, to be contrasted with gradual learning by association.
Other Gestalt psychologists attempted to investigate insight learning (restructuring)
in humans by adapting Köhler’s problem solving methodology (Duncker, 1945/1972; Maier,
1931; Wertheimer, 1954/1959). In order to do this, they attempted to create laboratory
situations that would be likely to lead to the initial attempt --> failure --> solution pattern
observed in Köhler’s apes. For example, Duncker (1945/1972) created problem situations
where participants needed to use a familiar object (e.g., cork, pliers, pendulum, paperclip, etc.) in a different manner than usual. In one condition, he first had solvers use the
object in its normal fashion, and then attempt to solve the target problem. In the control
condition, he had participants attempt the target problem without pre-utilization. The
idea behind this manipulation was that utilizing the familiar object in its usual manner
would structure the solver’s behavioral environment around the familiar functions of the
object, thereby making the use of the object for other functions less likely. He found that
the pre-utilization of the common object negatively affected solution rates and led to
more failed attempts during solving. Hence, problem difficulty via functional fixedness or
fixation became another phenomenon that was consistent with the Gestalt view that the
structure of the behavioral environment was more important in determining the difficulty
of a problem than the objective external geographical environment. Furthermore, fixation
or functional fixedness was thought to set the stage for insight learning processes since
restructuring through cognitive trial and error can be used to overcome these difficulties.
In summary, the Gestalt concept of insight was primarily intended to contrast learning
processes that function on an organism’s behavioral environment (such as restructuring
a mental representation through cognitive trial-and-error) against those that are a function of frequency of co-occurrence in an organism’s geographical environment (such as
association by contingency through behavioral trial-and-error). Insightful learning processes were proposed to be qualitatively different than associative learning processes in
that they did not require gradual and incremental attainment of new knowledge through
overt trial-and-error. Instead, insightful learning processes result in sudden, one-trial
learning. Furthermore, fixation or functional fixedness is a phenomenon that can lead to
impasse, and can set the stage for insight learning processes. However, insightful learning is possible in any situation where the initial application of previously learned solving
routines fails, and a solver begins cognitive trial-and-error processes that can restructure
the information in the behavioral environment.
Investigations of Insight Learning
Against this background it is interesting to note that very little modern research has been
conducted to investigate the core concept of sudden insight learning, which was actually
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the primary phenomenon of interest to the Gestalt psychologists. In order to investigate
learning of any kind, a basic condition that needs to be met is that behavior must be
sampled at multiple time points, with evidence for learning coming from changes in
behavior over time. While studies employing single problem solving attempts can investigate solution processes (as most studies of insight have done), only studies looking at
problem solving across multiple solution attempts can speak to whether insight learning
has occurred.
In one of the few modern studies that has attempted to directly investigate insight
learning, Dominowski and Buyer (2000) showed that people’s re-solution times on a set
of classic insight problems were significantly faster than solution times for people who
failed to initially solve the problems and were shown the answers. This study showed
that information attained from the successful solution of insight problems did lead to
better memory for solutions than that attained from being shown the solution. However,
Dominowski and Buyer (2001) did not contrast these findings with problems that required
the application of previously learned routines to complete the test of the Gestalt view
of insight learning. There are many reasons why one may expect faster solution times
on a second problem solving attempt and only some may reflect insight learning. Other
alternatives include effects of re-exposure such as reducing the effort needed to re-read
the problem, reduced time in formulating a solution strategy, or excluding branches of
the search space that were previously found to be ineffective (Ash, Wiley, & Cushen, 2009).
Ash and Wiley (2008) also provided some evidence supporting the Gestalt notion of
insight learning. This study used a hindsight bias paradigm to assess the initial representation of problems in memory. To do this, participants read a set of insight and arithmetic
word problems without attempting to solve them. The insight problems were arrangement puzzles composed of objects like pennies or matchsticks, while the arithmetic
problems contained a similar number of distinct numerical expressions. For each problem, participants rated how important they felt each component of the problem would
be toward reaching the solution. For the purposes of the present topic, the component
importance judgments can be interpreted as measures of the appropriateness of solvers’
initial problem representations. Those with more appropriate problem representations
should rate the components that must be used in solving the problem as more important
and components that are not critical for solution as less important. After making their
initial judgments, participants attempted to solve each of the problems. A week later,
participants were brought back to the laboratory and asked to remember their original
component importance ratings.
In this study, only correctly solved insight puzzles produced a hindsight bias. That
is, participants who had correctly solved the insight puzzles were unable to access their
memory for their initial judgments. No bias was seen on the second session component
importance ratings for incorrectly solved insight puzzles, or either correctly or incorrectly
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solved arithmetic word problems. In a second experiment, all participants were given
step-by-step instructions on how to solve the problems after they completed their initial
solution attempts. The results of this study showed the exact same pattern as Experiment 1. Providing people with the solutions for insight puzzles that they failed to solve
themselves did not lead to any changes in memory for importance ratings. Only those
who successfully solved the insight puzzles had higher component importance scores in
their second session memory ratings. In summary, Ash and Wiley (2008) found evidence
that people who correctly solved insight problems acquired a more appropriate problem
representation, and retained that more appropriate representation a week later without
incremental practice or instructions asking them to attempt to remember their solutions. However, no evidence for attainment or retention of a more appropriate problem
representation was observed when participants failed to solve the insight problems and
were shown the answers. Therefore, these results can be interpreted as evidence of the
one-trial insight learning process proposed by the Gestalt psychologists.
Because Ash and Wiley (2008) directly tested insight problems against arithmetic
problems that required the application of previously learned routines, these results go a
step further than the Dominowski and Buyer (2001) re-solution results. However, these
results still do not provide conclusive evidence for the Gestalt view of insight learning.
In particular, this study fails to take into account a key aspect of the Gestalt perspective
on insight; that it is the interaction between the current problem situation and a solver’s
initial internal representation of the situation that sets the stage for insight learning. In
other words, there is no such thing as an “insight problem,” and one cannot assume that
any puzzle will always be solved via the attempt-impasse-solution pattern. Classic insight
problems are laboratory stimuli that have been designed by researchers to be highly
likely to lead to solvers adopting inappropriate initial solution strategies (Ash, Wiley, &
Cushen, 2009) and to lead to fixation or impasse. However, despite their design, there is
no guarantee that solvers will actually experience impasse during solution (see Cranford
& Moss, 2012). For example, Fleck and Weisberg (2004) collected detailed verbal protocols
while participants attempted to solve Duncker’s candle box problem and found that, while
impasse was highly related to problem difficulty, most participants solved this problem
without reaching impasse. According to Gestalt theory, impasse, or initial failure, plays a
central role in insight learning. It is only in situations where solvers need to abandon their
original solution strategy that they will begin the cognitive trial-and-error processes that
can lead to the restructuring or re-organization of prior knowledge. Therefore, in order to
make strong conclusions about whether evidence exists for insight learning as a distinct
form of learning, one needs to assess whether solvers actually experience and overcome
impasse during their solution processes, and not simply assume that all puzzle problems
can only be solved via restructuring.
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Overview of the present study
The present study combined the methodologies of previous studies by using component importance ratings as a measure of solvers’ initial problem representations (Ash
& Wiley, 2008), re-solution times on a second problem solving attempt to assess learning
(Dominowski & Buyer, 2000), and verbal protocols to assess the occurrence of impasse
(Fleck & Weisberg, 2004) in order to empirically investigate the central aspects of Gestalt
insight learning theory. The object arrangement puzzles and arithmetic problems from
Ash and Wiley (2008) were used in order to directly test for learning differences between
problems solved by restructuring vs. routine solving procedures.
The first issues addressed in this research were necessary to set the stage for testing
the Gestalt view of Insight Learning. For the puzzle problems to serve as valid laboratory
models of the Gestalt insight learning sequence; 1) they should be more likely to lead to
impasses than the routine arithmetic problems and 2) people should be able to overcome
these impasses and solve the puzzle problems on their own (i.e. without specific hints or
direction by the experimenter). If these puzzle problems do not lead to impasses, then
they are unlikely to invoke the solving processes that can lead to insight learning. Furthermore, if solvers are unable to overcome these impasses, then, while the puzzle problems
may be good laboratory models for studying problem difficulty (i.e. fixation, impasse or
failure), they are not appropriate stimuli for studying insight learning. The next issue addressed by this research was the role of solvers’ initial problem representations on impasse
and problem difficulty. Gestalt theory predicts that for puzzle problems, inappropriate
initial representations should be related to problem difficulty (i.e. impasse and failure).
However, since the arithmetic problems should be solved by the application of previously
learned solution routines, their difficulty should stem from other factors than the solvers’
initial representations. Finally, this research addressed whether learning would vary as a
function of problem type, impasse and solution success. Decreases in re-solution times
were used as our measure of learning. Gestalt insight learning theory specifically predicts
greater decreases in re-solution times for the puzzle problems solved after impasse than
for puzzles solved without impasse, or arithmetic problems solved through the application of previously learned solution routines.
Method
Participants

Fifty-two introductory psychology students from the University of Illinois at Chicago psychology department participated to fulfill a class requirement. Data from five participants
were lost due to malfunctioning recording equipment.
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Materials & Apparatus
Puzzle Problems

The four object arrangement problems used in this experiment were the same as those
reported in Ash and Wiley (2008; Appendix). An example problem is shown in Figure 1.
These problems were selected from previous research on insightful problem solving.
Arithmetic Problems
Problems were selected that contained discrete elements that could be rated separately
to assess
initial representations
of the
problems
been
Thesolvers’
four arithmetic
problems were
theproblems.
same as These
those puzzle
reported
in Ash have
and Wiley
(2008).
An example
problem
is shown
Figure 1.
These
problems
wereinitial
novel
classified
as insight
problems
in previous
workinbecause
they
are likely
to evoke
problems that
solved by
the direct
of previously
learned
representations
that could
are notbe
conducive
to solution,
andapplication
they are unlikely
to be solved
via
strategies
or
routines.
The
problems
were
designed
to
complement
the
puzzle
the direct application of previously learned strategies or routines.
problems, by having some components that were useful in solving the problems
and other components that were not necessary for the solution.
Example Puzzle Problem
Below is a picture of an equation in which the roman numerals are constructed usExample Puzzle Problem
ing Below
matchsticks.
Notice that the both sides of the equation are not mathematically
is a picture of an equation in which the roman numerals are constructed using
equal.
Describe
how
makesides
the both
equalare
by not
moving
only one equal.
matchsticks. Noticeyou
thatcould
the both
of thesides
equation
mathematically
matchstick.
Describe how you could make the both sides equal by moving only one matchstick.
TheThe
rules
areare
that:
A)A)
only
one
stick
be discarded,
discarded,that
rules
that:
only
one
stickisistotobebemoved;
moved;B)
B) aa stick
stick cannot
cannot be
one
position
in the
equation
to another;
C) a C)
slanted
thatis,
is,ititcan
canonly
onlybebemoved
movedfrom
from
one
position
in the
equation
to another;
a stick
cannot
be
interpreted
as
a
vertical
matchstick;
D)
the
result
must
be
a
correct
arithmetic
slanted stick cannot be interpreted as a vertical matchstick; D) the result must be a
equation.
correct
arithmetic equation.

Example
Arithmetic
Problem
Example
Arithmetic
Problem
Solve for Y.
Solve
forthe
Y.exact number that the variable Y equals by using only the necessary equations
Find
Findfrom
the the
exact
that below.
the variable Y equals by using only the necessary equaset number
of equations
tions from the set of equations below.
3Z27		
* 3 = 27
2C - 9 = Z P – C = 2 DP – C = 2 D
3Z * 3 =
2C - 9 = Z		
5Z –11 = M

5Z –11 = M		

2 X = 56 + A

2 X = 56 + A		

8M – C = Y

8M – C = Y

3Y + 14 = X

3Y + 14 = X

Figure 1: Example Puzzle and Arithmetic Problems from Ash and Wiley (2008).

Figure 1. Example Puzzle and Arithmetic Problems from Ash and Wiley (2008).
Component Importance Judgments

Arithmetic
Problems
This measurement
asked participants to rate each component or element of each

problem
as to problems
“how important
it same
is in finding
solution
to the
problem.”
EachAnof
The four
arithmetic
were the
as thosethe
reported
in Ash
and
Wiley (2008).
the components
of theinproblems
was labeled
withwere
a letter
the top ofthat
thecould
page.
example
problem is shown
Figure 1. These
problems
novelatproblems
For the example puzzle problem shown in Figure 1, participants were asked to
rate five components, I, =, X, +, and IV. For the example arithmetic problem,
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be solved by the direct application of previously learned strategies or routines. The problems were designed to complement the puzzle problems, by having some components
that were useful in solving the problems and other components that were not necessary
for the solution.
Component Importance Judgments

This measurement asked participants to rate each component or element of each problem according to “how important it is in finding the solution to the problem.” Each of the
components of the problems was labeled with a letter at the top of the page. For the
example puzzle problem shown in Figure 1, participants were asked to rate five components, I, =, X, +, and IV. For the example arithmetic problem, participants were asked to
rate each equation. Underneath the problem was a set of 7.3 cm lines anchored with “very
unimportant” on the left side and “very important” on the right side. Participants indicated
their judgments by making a mark across the line with a pen or pencil.
Protocol Directions and Training

Participants were asked to talk aloud about what they were doing while attempting to
solve each problem. The exact directions were as follows:
Your task for this portion of the study is to solve a series of problems. You will be
given 4 minutes to solve each problem. I will tell you when to begin each problem.
So that we understand what you are doing while you solve each problem you will
be asked to talk aloud while solving the problem. Be sure to keep talking through
the problem solving process. If you are reading the problem, please do so aloud.
If you write anything on the paper while solving please verbalize what you are
writing. If you stop talking during the session I will remind you to keep talking. If
you reach a final answer before the entire 4 minutes has passed, please inform me
and tell me your final answer. You will not be given any feedback as to how close
you are to solution or the accuracy of your solution. If time runs out while you are
solving a problem please stop immediately and wait for my signal to begin the
next problem. Remember it is very important that you keep talking aloud while
solving the problem. Do you have any questions?
Before solving the main set of target problems, participants completed two practice
problems in order to become familiar with the think aloud instructions. One problem was a
long division problem that asked participants to divide a four-digit number by a two-digit
number. The second was a set of three anagrams in which the participants were asked to
rearrange scrambled letter strings to form common English nouns. Video and audio of all
protocols was recorded with a mini-8 Sony video camera.
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Procedure

Participants completed the study individually. The study consisted of two one-hour sessions exactly one week apart. Participants were seated at a 4 feet by 3 feet desk with a
camera mounted on a tripod approximately 2 feet to their right and three feet above
the desk to record progress on written materials. On the desk there was an 8.5 by 11
inch rectangle on which the camera was focused. The participants were asked keep the
materials over the rectangle at all times. The experimenter sat 4 feet to the right of the
participant throughout the experiment.
Participants began by completing a rating packet that included the Component Importance Judgment task for each of the eight problems. In total, participants were asked
to make 105 ratings about the eight problems. Participants were randomly assigned to
receive the problems in one of eight counterbalanced orders that were created with the
constraints that every other problem was either a puzzle or arithmetic problem and that
each problem was the first and last problem in one of the orders. This order stayed constant for each participant across all materials. The directions for the rating packet stressed
that participants were not to begin solving the problems and that we were interested
in their initial impressions of the problems. Participants were given a maximum of 15
minutes to complete the entire rating booklet. This time limit was determined via pilot
testing, which showed that participants required up to 1 minute to read each problem
and up to 4 seconds to make each rating. All participants finished the rating booklets
under this time limit.
Next, participants received the think-aloud instructions and completed the two
practice problems. They were given 4 minutes to complete each practice problem. During
and after each of the practice problems, participants were given feedback about their
think-aloud performance. Comments were constrained to think-aloud performance and
no feedback was ever given on problem solving performance. After the practice problems, participants attempted to solve each of the target problems in the same order as
the rating packet. Participants were given 4 minutes to solve each problem. While solving
the target problems the experimenter reminded subjects to talk under only three conditions. The first was if the participant had failed to make any utterance (including utterances such as um, uh, ah) for more than 10 seconds. The second condition was if hand
motions or writing on the page were not accompanied by verbalizations. The third was
if verbalizations were too quiet to be picked up by the recording equipment. Feedback
on solution progress was only given if participants gave “impossible” or “unsolvable” as
their final answer. On these occasions, participants were reminded that all problems had
solutions and told how much solving time remained. The participants were instructed
to circle their final answer and inform the experimenter when they reached their final
answer. Upon attempting all the problems, participants were asked not to discuss the
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details of any of the problems they saw or their solutions with anyone else in the Subject
Pool and reminded to return for the second session one week later. Participants were
given no feedback about the correctness of their solutions and were not informed of the
purpose of the second session.
Participants returned to the laboratory exactly one week later. During the second
session, participants were reminded of the protocol instructions and asked solve each of
the problems. All solving procedures were identical to session one.
Data Coding
Initial Problem Representation Scores

The importance ratings for each of the problem components were recorded by measuring
the distance of each mark from the left side of the line in centimeters. Ratings for components used in solving the problems were averaged, and ratings for components not
used in solving the problem were reverse coded and averaged. Next, these two subscores
were averaged to form one overall score for each problem. Higher scores on this measure
denoted a more appropriate initial representation of the problem (i.e. higher importance
ratings on components useful for solution and lower ratings on components not useful
for solution).
Impasse

The videos were coded for impasse by two independent coders, one of whom was unfamiliar with the purpose or predictions of the study. Impasse has been defined as “a state
of mind that is accompanied by a subjective feeling of not knowing what to do and a cessation of overt problem-solving behavior” (Knoblich et al. 1999). This was taken literally for
the operational definition of impasse used in coding the protocols. Durations of silence in
the face of reminders to speak, utterances related to impasse (being lost, stuck, etc.), and
lack of overt problem solving behavior (e.g., not writing, or not pointing to the problem)
were taken as signs of impasse. Inter-rater reliability results from the independent coders’
binary (impasse, no impasse) judgments on the 47 participants revealed that impasse
coding was reliable, Kappa = .92, p < .001.
Solution Success

Solutions were coded using the paper and pencil solution packets. The solution was coded
as successful if the participant produced the intended answer for each problem and circled
the final answer. If it was unclear from the problem packet, then the video was consulted
to determine if the correct final answer was reached. All incorrect solutions and problems
that were not finished by the end of the 4 minutes were coded as unsuccessful.
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Solution Times

Solution times were recorded based on the video data. The time was recorded as the
point at which the participant indicated to the experimenter that they had reached a final
answer. The time taken by the participants to explain the final answer was not included
in their solving times.
Analysis Strategy

As discussed previously, it cannot be assumed that all puzzle problems will lead to impasse.
Instead, impasse and restructuring are the result of an interaction between the solver and
the problem situation. Thus, to capture this interaction, all data were analyzed at the level
of observation. With 47 participants solving eight problems, this resulted in 376 observations (half from puzzle problems and half from arithmetic). In this design, solvers with
differential impasse and solution rates may contribute different numbers of observations
to different cells (including no observations). Therefore, a linear mixed-model analysis of
variance approach was used to analyze these data where problem type was entered as
a fixed independent variable, impasse and solution success were entered as fixed factor
covariates, and participant was entered as random factor. Essentially, this analysis allows
for any individual differences between participants to be removed from the omnibus
and follow-up comparisons where possible, without requiring observations for every
participant in every combination of the independent and quasi-independent variables
as would be required by a repeated-measures analysis. Restricted Maximum Likelihood
Estimation was used to compute mean and variance parameter estimates in all analyses.
For the Initial Problem Representation Scores, the inclusion of the random participant
factor prevented the models from converging. Therefore, these analyses were conducted
without the random participant factor using a between groups analysis of variance at the
level of the problem observation.

Results and Discussion
Solution Success and Impasse
Participants were 2.77 times more likely to come to impasse on the Puzzle problems
than on the Arithmetic problems (puzzles M = 61% vs. arithmetic M = 22%; t(46) = 7.55,
p < .001)1. Table 1 shows the pattern of impasse and solution success by problem. These
data show that the pattern of higher impasse rates on the Puzzle problems was fairly
consistent across problems. Separate 2 (arithmetic vs. puzzle) x 2 (impasse vs. no impasse)
1This analysis was reported in Ash & Wiley (2008) Note 1 (p. 835) as a manipulation check for our insight vs. incremental problem
manipulation. We are reporting it here for the reader’s convenience. All other analyses and results in this paper are original and
have not been reported in any other publication.
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chi-square tests were conducted for all possible pairwise sets of Arithmetic and Puzzle
problems. These analyses showed that the only cases where the Puzzles did not lead to
significantly more impasses was when the Glasses problem was compared to the Solve
for Y (χ2 = 2.36, p = .125) or Food problems (χ2 = 2.36, p = .125). On all other comparisons,
the puzzles were more likely to lead to impasse (χ2 = 13.95 to 29.10, ps < .001). The parenthesized numbers in the successful solution column of Table 1 show the rates at which
participants were able to solve problems after coming to an impasse. For the Arithmetic
problems, the Solve for Y problem had the lowest post-impasse solution rate. For the Puzzle
problems, the Glasses problem had the lowest solution rate. However, these results show
that overcoming impasses to find the correct solution is fairly common in both problem
sets. In fact, on two of the puzzles, Triangle and Match XV, the majority of solutions came
after solvers experienced an impasse.

Another important aspect of this descriptive analysis is the observation that both
the Arithmetic and Puzzle problems were solved with and without impasse. This allows
for the analysis of all effects as a function of problem type, solution success and solution
process (i.e. whether or not solvers reached impasse). The Gestalt position would propose that solution after impasse should be more likely on problems showing evidence of
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inappropriate initial problem representations. Furthermore, the Gestalt position would
propose that the type of new information generated through the application of previously learned solving routines should be qualitatively different than the new information
emerging from solving puzzle problems following impasse.
Initial Problem Representations
In order to investigate the relationship between solvers’ initial problem representations
and their later solution process, we analyzed component importance judgments as a
function of problem type and solution type (Successful with No Impasse, Successful with
Impasse, and Unsuccessful). These results are displayed in Figure 2. On these scores, higher
values represent more appropriate initial problem representations. The analysis revealed
a main effect of solution type, F(1, 370) = 11.36, p < .001, and a main effect of problem
type, F(1, 370) = 16.46, p < .001. These effects were subsumed in a significant solution
type X problem type interaction, F(1, 370) = 3.47, p = .032.

Figure 2. Mean Initial Problem Representation scores as a function of problem type
and solution type. Higher scores mean more appropriate Initial Problem Representations. Error bars = estimated standard error of the mean.
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Follow-up analyses on Puzzle problems revealed a significant simple effect of solution
type, F(1, 370) = 8.07, p < .001. Initial Problem Representation Scores on Puzzle problems
that were correctly solved after impasse were not significantly different than those for
unsuccessfully solved problems, F(1, 370) = 2.63, p=.11. However, the Initial Problem
Representation Scores were significantly higher for Puzzle problems correctly solved
without impasse when compared to the problems solved with impasse and unsolved
problems, F(1, 370) = 9.25, p = .003. These results suggest that on the puzzle problems,
less appropriate initial problem representations were related to problem difficulty which
resulted in a higher incidence of impasses and more failures to solve.
Follow-up analyses on Arithmetic problems revealed a significant simple effect of
solution type, F(1, 370) = 4.05, p = .018. However, the pattern on the Arithmetic problems
was quite different than that observed on the Puzzle problems. In this analysis, Arithmetic
problems solved with impasse showed evidence of higher Initial Problem Representation
Scores when compared to the other solution types, F(1, 370) = 4.57, p = .033, and there
was no significant difference between mean Initial Problem Representation Scores on
Arithmetic problems that were correctly solved without impasse and those that participants failed to solve, F(1, 370) = 2.83, p = .093.
This result suggests that people who had more appropriate initial representations
were more likely to come to impasse before solving the Arithmetic problems. However,
this result is difficult to interpret because of the low rates of impasse on the Arithmetic
problems. The most important result from the Arithmetic problems is that the accuracy
of participants’ initial problem representations was not predictive of success or failure
on these problems.
These results suggest that the Puzzle problems were likely to be initially inappropriately represented and that these inappropriate initial representations were related
to problem difficulty. These results also support the Gestalt view that when problems
require the application of previously used routines, solvers are likely to form an appropriate representation of the problem and impasse is not likely to occur. Therefore, the
results of the impasse and initial problem representation analyses provide evidence that
the puzzle problems selected for this study are internally valid laboratory models for investigating the Gestalt theory of insight learning, because these problems were likely to
lead to impasse, solvers were able to overcome these impasses and solve the problems,
and less appropriate initial representations of the problem were associated with problem
difficulty and impasse.
First and Second Session Solution Times
Our critical measure for testing the Gestalt theory of insight learning was changes in solution times between a first and second attempt. Re-solution rates for prior solvers were
generally high and similar across both types of problems (Arithmetic 73% to 94%; Puzzles
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87% to 100%). The estimated mean solution times on both first and second problem
solving attempts are shown in Figure 3 as a function of problem type, impasse, and initialattempt solution success. Results of the mixed models analysis revealed significant main
effects of solving session, F(1, 233.66) = 58.35, p < .001, impasse, F(1, 249.80) = 18.19, p <
.001, problem type, F(1, 261.92) = 135.24, p < .001, and a session X impasse interaction,
F(1, 34.47) = 18.19, p < .001. These effects were subsumed within a significant session X
problem type X impasse interaction, F(1, 223.66) = 21.41, p < .001.

Figure 3. Estimated mean successful solution times as a function of Week 1 success,
impasse and problem type. Error bars = standard error of the mean.
On Puzzle problems, there was a significant session X impasse interaction, F(1, 82.55)
= 48.39, p < .001. Follow-up analyses revealed no significant difference between Week 1
solution times and Week 2 re-solution times on problems solved without impasse, F(1,
82.55) = 0.86, p = .357, as shown in the first pair of bars in Figure 2. However, there was a
large difference between Week 1 solution times and Week 2 re-solution times for problems
solved with an impasse, F(1, 82.55) = 79.42, p < .001, as shown in the second pair of bars.
On Arithmetic problems (third and fourth pairs of bars), there was no evidence of
an interaction between session and impasse, F(1, 112.27) = 1.03, p = .313. There was a
simple main effect of session showing faster Week 2 solving times (Week 1: M = 172.06 s
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vs. Week 2: M = 134.22 s), F(1, 112.28) = 30.29, p < .001. There was also a simple main effect
of impasse with faster solving times on Arithmetic problems solved without impasse (No
Impasse: M = 144.07 s vs. Impasse: M = 162.21 s), F(1, 147.25) = 3.96, p = .048.
These results show qualitatively different re-solution patterns for Puzzle problems
and Arithmetic problems. On Puzzle problems, those who solved without impasse on
their first attempt did so very quickly and solved just as quickly on the second attempt.
However, for those who experienced an impasse, solving times were much slower on the
initial attempt and re-solution times were as fast as they were for solvers who did not
reach impasse.
On Arithmetic problems, impasse generally slowed both initial solving and resolution times, and re-solution times were generally faster than initial solving times. This
pattern of results suggests that the new information acquired in overcoming impasse
on the puzzle problems was being remembered in a qualitatively different fashion than
the new information acquired by applying previously learned problem solving routines.
Next, we investigated whether the differences between initial and re-solution times
were really a function of prior solution or if they were just due to re-exposing participants
to the same problems. For the re-exposure analysis, we used data from participants who
failed to solve during the first session, but were able to solve during the second session.
The Week 2 solution rates for prior unsuccessful solvers ranged from 29% to 59.5% on the
Arithmetic problems and 8.8% to 22.6% on the Puzzle problem. Week 2 solution times
were analyzed as a function of Week 1 solution type (Successful with No Impasse, Successful with Impasse, and Unsuccessful) and problem type (see Figure 3, dark bars) using
a mixed models analysis. Results revealed main effects for problem type, F(1, 166.99) =
73.49, p < .001, and solution type, F(1, 176.71) = 13.55, p < .001, which were subsumed
within a significant problem type X solution type interaction, F(1, 173.51) = 8.63, p < .001.
Follow-up analyses on Puzzle problems revealed a simple effect of solution type, F(1,
171.84) = 18.09, p < .001. Session 2 solution times on problems that participants previously failed to solve were significantly slower than those for problems solved without
impasse, F(1, 169.68) = 20.57, p < .001, or with impasse, F(1, 170.31) = 34.87, p < .001, on
the first attempt. However, on Arithmetic problems there was no simple effect of initial
solution type on Week 2 solution times, F(1, 178.51) = 1.67, p = .192.
In other words, the re-solution effects observed on the puzzle problems solved with
impasse were not simply due to re-exposure to the problems. Therefore, the faster solving
times on problems previously solved with impasse were truly “re-solution” effects, in that
they depended on whether or not the problems were actually solved by the participants.
However, the faster Week 2 solution times for Arithmetic problems were not necessarily “resolution” effects, because problems that were not correctly solved during the first session
had the same decreased solution times on the second attempt as those that were solved
during the first session. This suggests that the second session time savings on Arithmetic
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problems was largely due to factors that were unrelated to participants discovering the
correct answer to the problem or the solution process by which they found that answer.
In summary, the ultimate goal for this research was to explore whether evidence
could be found for the Gestalt theory of insight learning. We found that puzzle problems
that were solved after coming to an impasse showed the re-solution patterns that were
predicted in the Gestalt psychologists’ theory of insight learning. These results also showed
that overcoming an impasse during routine problem solving does not lead to the same
learning as overcoming an impasse associated with an inappropriate problem representation, and that the reduction in solution time between initial and second attempts on
routine problems is more likely due to re-exposure to the problems and does not depend
the success or failure of the participants’ initial attempts.

Conclusions
The results of this investigation offer empirical support for several of the major assumptions of the Gestalt theory of insight learning. First, it was demonstrated that the puzzle
problems were more likely to lead to impasse than the arithmetic problems. However,
it is also important to note that not all solvers experienced impasse on all of the puzzle
problems. Thus, these results replicate Fleck and Weisberg (2004) by showing not all solvers come to impasse before solving classic insight problems. Furthermore, they highlight
the importance of taking a process-oriented approach to studying insight phenomenon
instead of a problem-oriented approach (Ash, Cushen, & Wiley, 2009; Ellen, 1982; Fleck
& Weisberg, 2004).
Second, people were regularly able to overcome impasse and go on to solve the
puzzle problems. For the purposes of studying insight learning, it is important to have
problems that people can solve without hints or experimenter interventions. Hints and
training interventions are useful methods for studying fixation and other sources of
problem difficulty (Ash, Cushen, & Wiley, 2009). However, according to Gestalt insight
learning theory, there is a need to differentiate between new information obtained from
the external environment, and new information resulting from internal problem solving
processes. Exposure to external hints and training interventions should lead to gradual
associative learning, while only situations where solvers overcome impasse through internal restructuring or re-organizational processes should lead to sudden insight learning
(Cushen & Wiley, 2012; Ellen, 1982).
Third, inappropriate problem representations were found to be related to difficulty
on the puzzle problems but not related to problem difficulty on the arithmetic problems
requiring the routine application of previously learned solution strategies. Those who more
appropriately represented the puzzle problems from the outset showed less likelihood
of coming to impasse, and very fast initial solving times. In essence, this suggests these
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situations were not problems, in that the solution was readily attainable without any major
obstacle. However, in situations where solvers inappropriately represented the puzzles,
these were difficult problems that led to impasse and failure. This can be contrasted with
the Arithmetic problems where difficulty was not related to solvers’ initial problem representations and solvers showed faster solving times during the second session regardless of
whether or not they had previously solved the problem. This result is important because
it supports the Gestalt notion that the structure of the behavioral environment, or internal
problem representation, can be a source of difficulty in problem solving.
Fourth, and most important for the Gestalt insight learning theory, the new information discovered by overcoming impasse on the Puzzle problems was readily retained by
solvers. Second session solving times on Puzzle problems that were solved after impasse
were considerably faster than the first session solving times. Furthermore, second session solution times on Puzzle problems that were not previously solved were slower than
previously solved problems, and similar to the first session solving times on problems
where participants reached impasse. This pattern is exactly what would be predicted by
the Gestalt concept of insight learning and stands in stark contrast to the learning patterns observed on the routine Arithmetic problems.
There are several limitations on the inferences that can be drawn from the current
study. For example, the inclusion of the initial component importance rating procedure
may have had an effect on later problem solving behaviors in the current study (Cushen
& Wiley 2012). Therefore, before drawing firm conclusions about one-trial learning, these
results need to be replicated on a wider variety of problem tasks and using different assessments of learning. Furthermore, these results do not speak to the processes that were
involved in overcoming impasse on these puzzle problems, or whether these processes
relate to the cognitive trial-and-error and restructuring processes proposed by Gestalt
psychologists. However, these results do offer empirical validation of the basic assumptions of the Gestalt theory of insight learning and provide a framework by which future
research into insight learning can be conducted.
Internal Representations and Sudden Learning
In the introduction, we argued that the Gestalt concept of insight was not intended to
refer to specific problem solving phenomena. Instead it was a term that was intended to
differentiate psychological phenomena that function at the level of an organism’s internal
behavioral environment from those that function on the external geographic environment.
The Gestalt psychologists disputed the associationist assumption that gradual learning
processes based on frequency of co-occurrence could be used to explain the acquisition of
all an organism’s knowledge about the relationships among external stimuli and internal
ideas. Gestalt psychologists proposed that an alternative mode of learning was needed to
explain the acquisition of new knowledge as a result of conceptual thinking and reasoning.
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Gestalt psychologists were particularly interested in the distinction between information created by enacting previously learned solution routines or engaging in overt trialand-error processes, and information gained via internal reflection that involves discovering fundamentally new relationships distinct from those suggested by prior experience
(Duncker, 1945/1972; Koffka, 1935/63; Köhler, 1925; Maier, 1931; Wertheimer, 1954/1959).
It seemed that only this alternative approach to learning could explain creative thinking.
For example, Wertheimer (1954/1959) proposed that “discovery does not merely mean that
a result is reached which was not known before, that a question is somehow answered,
but rather that the situation is grasped in a new and deeper fashion—whereupon the
field broadens and larger possibilities come into sight. These changes of the situation as
a whole imply changes in the structural meaning of part items, changes in their place,
role and function, which often lead to important consequences” (pg. 169).
In other words, it was proposed that some knowledge that is gained during problem solving is the result of a fundamental restructuring or reorganization of the solver’s
prior knowledge or interpretation of the problem situation. From this perspective, the
hallmarks of insight learning, as proposed by the Gestalt theorists, were that it was the
result of reflections on internal, mental representations of a situation which resulted in
new understanding that was attained immediately and not gradually.
In many ways, this emphasis on internal representation is what motivated the resurgence of interest in cognitive psychology in response to the Behaviorist theories in the late
1950s. It is also revealing that both the Gestalt psychologists and cognitive psychologists
focused on research in perception, attention, memory and problem solving to challenge
the dominant associationist traditions of their time. Anderson (1993) noted this connection
when he wrote “Although Köhler and the other Gestalt psychologists used problem-solving
tasks to demonstrate the inadequacies in the behaviorist conceptions of learning, they
failed to offer an analysis of the problem-solving process… Problem solving finally was
given a coherent program of analysis by Newell and Simon (1972).” Newell and Simon’s
(1972) research can indeed be considered a formalized model of the Gestalt concept of
the behavioral environment. In fact, the Gestalt psychologists and Newell and Simon
could be contrasted as two sides of the same coin. On one side, the Gestalt psychologists
were deeply interested in the perceptual, learning, and memory processes involved in
the construction of the behavioral environment, but they were somewhat vague on the
processes involved in cognitive trial-and-error or reasoning. On the other side, Newell and
Simon’s (1972) model proposed very specific processes for reasoning and problem solving,
but were largely agnostic about the processes that lead to the acquisition of knowledge,
or the construction of the internal problem representation.
Focusing on insight learning as a process by which internal representations are
formed and revised is an important message to be taken away from the current study. If
one conceives of insight as a specific problem solving process that accompanies solutions
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on certain laboratory puzzle problems, then this effectively limits the type of research that
will be conducted and the implications that can be drawn from that research. However,
if one conceives of insight as a learning phenomenon in the way the Gestalt psychologists intended, then research on insight phenomena becomes more central, instead of a
tangential exercise in explaining strange behavior on esoteric puzzle problems.
The concept of the behavioral environment not only relates to Newell and Simon’s
(1972) concept of the problem space and problem representation, it also has parallels
in the types of mental representations proposed throughout cognitive psychology. For
example, Kintsch (1993; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) has distinguished between different
levels of mental representations involved in text comprehension and memory. The surface model is the mental representation of the actual words and phrases in contained in
a piece of text or discourse. The situation model is a representation of the meaning that
has been elaborated upon and integrated with the reader’s prior knowledge.
One can clearly see the relationship between this model of text comprehension
and the Gestalt concepts of the geographic and behavioral environments. Further, the
tension between associationist and Gestalt theories has a correlate in the text processing
literature. Kintsch (2001) developed a computational model of text comprehension that
determines the relationship among the meaning of words based on their frequency of
co-occurrence in usage across a large sample of texts. Therefore, this model provides a
strictly associationist account of comprehension and memory for discourse. However, other
researchers have proposed comprehension models that involve memory representations
that are based on the causal relations between the concepts described in the discourse
(Langston & Trabasso, 1999; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985). Wolfe, Magliano, and Larsen
(2005) demonstrated that these two modeling approaches explain independent variability
in participants’ memory for the information presented in a text and the judgments derived from that information. They explained this by proposing that the association-based
model captures bottom-up comprehension processes, while the causal model captures
top-down comprehension processes.
We propose that the differentiation between “bottom-up” and “top-down” is really
just a modern instantiation of the Gestalt notion that qualitatively different psychological
processes function at levels of the geographic and behavioral environments. We also find
it compelling that the types of processes proposed at each level mirror the differentiation
between associative relationships and deeper functional relationships (such as causation)
that were central to the Gestalt theory of insight learning. This suggests that far from being just a problem solving phenomenon, future research into insight learning may lead
to discoveries that can be applied to diverse domains of cognition.
In a second example, Anderson and colleagues (Anderson, Bothell, Byrne, Douglass,
Lebiere & Qin, 2004; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) have elaborated on Newell and Simon’s
(1972) original computational model of reasoning processes by integrating it with compu-
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tational models of attention, perception, memory and learning processes. Their Adaptive
Components of Thought – Rational (ACT-R) is designed to be a fully functioning cognitive
architecture (Newell, 1990) that can be used to explain how the different components of
the mind work together to produce unified cognitive behaviors and experiences (Anderson et al, 2004). For the purposes of problem solving, this model proposes three different
types of memory. Declarative memory is the long-term memory store containing factual,
definitional, and semantic information. In this model, memory structures are composed
of nodes representing different pieces of information stored in long-term memory and
associative connections between these nodes. When a piece of information enters memory
either through perception or retrieval, activation spreads through these associative links
and brings related information into consciousness. Procedural memory is where the
processes that can be used to act on these memory representations are stored (i.e. the
available operators). These processes are modeled as if/then statements combined with
sets of memory and command operations. Finally, the Goal Module directs attention (or
activation) to the different memory modules based on the goals of the problem solver
and their current progress in solving a problem.
For the purposes of the present discussion of insight learning, the important aspect
of this model is that learning in both the Declarative Memory module and the Procedural
Memory module is based on associative processes that depend on co-occurrence. Therefore, ACT-R’s basic learning mechanism is similar to those proposed by the empiricist
philosophers. Since, ACT-R allows for the association of both co-occurring sensations and
co-occurring ideas, it has processes that are similar to Bain’s (1855/1977) law of constructive association which allow for new ideas to be created from new combinations of past
experience. However, these creative associations, just like any other associations, need to
be built up gradually over time through repeated co-occurrence.
The Gestalt theory of insight learning proposes that that new combinations of prior
experience created from reasoning processes that re-organize and restructure can be
learned quickly and without repetition. Furthermore, they propose that different learning
mechanisms function on information presented in geographic and behavioral environments. Therefore, current ACT-R learning mechanisms would not be able to accommodate
these types of processes. Developing computational models that can account for creative
leaps, novel discoveries, and instances of one-trial learning still represents an interesting
challenge for association-based models (Ash, Cushen & Wiley, 2009; Langley & Jones, 1988).
In closing, the main point of this paper is that the original Gestalt conception of insight
was much more encompassing than just a problem solving mechanism or the generator
of Aha! moments. It was a general principle that learning based on reasoning or thinking is
qualitatively different than learning based on association. We hope that this review of the
Gestalt concept of insight will help future researchers in clarifying the relationships and
differences between different insight phenomenon, and that some find these results, at
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the very least, compelling enough to inspire them to include measures of representation,
solution process, and learning in their future work on insight and creativity.
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